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Funt: Domestic Relations--Constructive Desertion--Husband's Duty to Pro
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
DoMESTIc RELATIONS CONSTRUCTIVE DESERTION HUSBAND'S DUTY TO PROVIDE A SEPARATE HOME FOR His WIFE. - W

sought a divorce from H on the grounds of constructive desertion.
H filed a cross-bill charging actual desertion. H and W lived in
H's parental home although H was financially able to furnish a
separate home. W left because of a "host of petty annoyances
and tyrannies" which she suffered from H's mother. H made
no satisfactory effort at reconciliation. Held: W was entitled to
an a mensa decree. H's petition was denied. Hughes v. Hughes.'
In an early case, the West Virginia Court of Appeals interpreted the "wilful desertion" statute as requiring the intentional
cessation of cohabitation without reasonable cause. By this test
"reasonable cause" exists only when the offending party's conduct amounts to legal cruelty sufficient to support a decree a
mensa or a vineulo. This is the general rule.' West Virginia,
however, relaxed this requirement in Horkheimer v. Horkheimer,'
where the court granted a decree though there was apparently no
ground for affirmative relief. The decree was granted solely upon
the wife's right to a separate home if the husband was financially
1169 S.E. 403 (W. Va. 1933).
'Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S. E. 12 (1890). Accord: Alkire v.
Alkire, 33 W. Va. 517, 11 S. E. 11 (1890); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 68 W. Va.
15, 69 S. E. 381 (1909).
"'Justifiable cause which will excuse a husband or wife from leaving the
other, must be such as could be made the foundation of a judicial proceeding
for a divorce a Tnensa. 1 Martin v. Martin, supra n. 2; Dawkins v. Dawkins,
72 W. Va. 789, 79 S. E. 822 (1912); Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 80 S. E.
846 (1913); Fisher v. Fisher, 81 W. Va. 105, 93 S. E. 1041 (1917); Kittle
v. Kittle, 86 W. Va. 46, 102 S. E. 799 (1920); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 87
W. Va. 534, 105 S. E. 771 (1921). Although the statute does not specify
"wilfulness" as an element of desertion a mensa, the court said in Hall v.
Hall, 69 W. Va. 175, 71 S. E. 103 (1911) "Though the statute allows a
divorce a mensa et thoro for abandonment or desertion, in general terms, and
does not in express words require willfulness, it must be assumed that the
legislators, in drafting and enacting it, intended such abandonment and desertion as is generally recognized and treated as sufficient ground for a
limited divorce."
'Pidge v. Pidge, 44 Mass. 257 (1841); Lyster v. Lyster, 111 Mass. 327
(1873); Arnaboldi v. Arnaboldi, 101 N. J. Eq. 126, 138 At. 116 (1927);
Searcy v. Searcy, 196 Mo. App. 311, 193 S. W. 871 (1917); Towson v.
Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48 (1920).
r106 W. Va. 634, 146 S. E. 614 (1929). "The law entitles a wife to a
home over which she alone may preside. When there is no serious obstacle
in the way of the husband providing such a home, she is not required to live
in the home of his parents under their domination."
A denial of this
"right" amounts to legal cruelty, and there is compliance with the general
rule. Accord: Roberts v. Roberts, 108 W. Va. 71, 150 S. E. 231 (1929);
Davis v. Davis, 108 W. Va. 157, 150 S. E. 523 (1929); Walker v. Walker,
109 W. Va. 662, 155 S.E. 903 (1930).
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able to provide it. In Beu7tring v. Beuhring, the court suggests
that the husband must not only provide a separate home, but a
home at a sufficient distance from the home of relatives to protect
his wife from their frequent intrusions. Quaere, must the husband
provide a new home if the wife finds the neighbors (not relatives)
annoying? The instant case does not go as far as the Benling
case but it aids in fixing in West Virginia a qualification upon
the general rule that the husband may determine the domicil and
the wife must follow him unless the abode endangers her life or
health." Apparently in West Virginia, the wife may assert her
right to a separate home and a refusal by the husband, financially
competent to provide such a home, will amount to "justifiable
cause" for the wife to leave.8 Or conversely, the husband's refusal to provide a separate home is "legal" cruelty.' The critics
of this conclusion allege that this permits the wife to gain a decree by leaving home that she could not acquire by remaining."
Perhaps the distinction is a real one - that the conduct acquiesced in by her husband in the one case is not a real threat
upon her life or health, that in the second case her very action
demonstrates that the threat is real. The result of the instant
case is consonant with a general demand for a re-definition of
cruelty to fit a changed social order.
-MORRIS

S.

FUNT.

111 W. Va. 135, 161 S. E. 25 (1931). "While it is the conceded right
of the husband to determine primarily the location of the matrimonial
domicile, that right must be exercised reasonably, and he may not arbitrarily
require his wife to live with or in close proxinity to a relative who mistreats
her as did the daughter in this instance."2 "If such a requirement is made,
the wife is justified in leaving the husband and may charge him with constructive desertion."
7Davis v. Davis, Walker v. Walker, both supra n. 5. And the test of danger
is apparently subjective. Watson v. Watson, 112 W. Va. 77, 163 S. E. 768
(1932).
'Hughes v. Hughes, supra n. 1. Horkheimer v. Horkheimer, supra n. 5.
The Horkheimer case apparently rests upon three closely related cases. (1)
"One of the
Hoffhines v. Hoffhines, 146 Md. 350, 126 Ati. 112 (1924).
strong incentives for marriage is the prospect and expectation by the newly
married parties of establishing an independent home . . . . This instinctive
desire of home building should be encouraged and fostered, as upon the
foundation of independent and happy homes the stability and prosperity of
(2) Marshak v. Marshak, 115 Ark. 51, 170 S.
a nation largely depends.-"
W. 567 (1914). (3) Brewer v. Brewer, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N. W. 161 (1907).
"The family is the unit of the social organism, and, while the institution
of new families to some extent involves the disintegration of the older household, it is absolutely necessary to continued social existence."
' Supra n. 5, 7. But see: State v. Beslin, 19 Idaho 185, 112 Pac. 1053
(1911); Coleman v. Coleman, 164 Ky. 709, 176 S. W. 186 (1915); Powell
v. Powell, 29 Vt. 148 (1856); Winkler v. Powell, 173 Ala. 46, 55 So. 536
(1911).
10 (1930) 28 MICH. L. REv. 623.
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